T he landmark Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of
, while calling for the desegregation of elementary and secondary public schools, shaped Black colleges in the coming decades. Describing the typical view of Black colleges in the post-Brown era, Derrick Bell (2004) noted these institutions were seen as substandard simply because of their majority Black populations. With the struggle for racial integration taking place throughout the country, securing support for an "all-Black" institution became increasingly difficult for Black college leaders (gasman, 2007) . Some liberals and foundation leaders in particular came to the conclusion, off the record, that Black colleges would not be around in the coming years. As a result, money to Black colleges dried up considerably during the first few years after Brown and did not increase substantially again until the early 1970s (gasman, 2007; Trent, 1981) . eventually, during the civil rights era, foundation leaders decided to support a few Black colleges such as Atlanta University, Dillard 1960s, historian David garrow examined fundraising for civil rights causes, discovering that once civil rights and student activism became more conventional, it was considered stylish to support causes such as the Congress of Racial equality (CORe) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC; garrow, 1987) . Likewise, Marybeth gasman (2007) has examined the impact of the Black consciousness movement of the 1970s on the approaches to fundraising for Black colleges. Overall, however, there is a modest amount of scholarship that examines the concrete strategies used by Black colleges to garner funds, especially during the post-Brown and civil rights era. Additional scholarship will help us further understand which fundraising practices work most successfully with Black colleges, given their distinctive missions of racial uplift (gasman & AndersonThompkins, 2003) . 2 This article uses historical methods, and as such, a key part of the approach is the examination of primary sources from the period in question (post-1954 through the mid-1970s). Such sources in this case study include the Oram Fundraising group's archival papers (housed at the Payton Philanthropic Studies Library at Indiana University-Purdue University), 3 archival papers at Hampton University, and the papers of the UNCF (located at the Robert Woodruff Library, Clark Atlanta University, and the Library of Congress). We have buttressed the information gathered from these archival papers with oral history interviews conducted with Black college administrators and fundraising consultants. 4 Oral history records the voices of those directly involved with the phenomena being studied, documenting human experiences and distilling larger ideas and trends (Yow, 1994) .
History and Overview of Hampton University
Hampton University was founded as Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in 1868 shortly after the Civil War for the express purpose of preparing young Black men and women "to lead and teach their newly freed people" (Hampton University Archival Finding Aid, n.d., p. 1). From its beginnings, the university has "sought to instill in its students the precepts of efficiency, character and service to society" (Hampton University Archival Finding Aid, n.d., p. 1). Samuel Chapman Armstrong, the son of missionary parents, founded the institute with the assistance of the American Missionary Association. Armstrong emphasized the concepts of "self-sufficiency, intelligent labor, and solid moral character" (engs, 1999 ; Hampton University Archival Finding Aid, n.d., p. 1). Hampton Institute began with an emphasis on industrial education and, along with Tuskegee University, is perhaps the best example of a classic industrial institution (Anderson, 1988) . However, over the years, Hampton began to embrace a liberal arts 4 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly curriculum to complement its focus on practical education (Anderson, 1988; Drewry & Doermann, 2001) . Despite a modification in the institution's curricular focus, Hampton University has always been more conservative in its approach to education and leadership, often working with those in power to make gradual change and favoring evolution over revolution (Anderson, 1988; Drewry & Doermann, 2001 ). This strategy can be seen in the institution's approach to fundraising as well.
The Commonwealth of Virginia During the Civil Rights Era
To appreciate the context for fundraising in Virginia during the civil rights movement, it is crucial to understand the racial climate in the state. In particular, one must examine the educational climate at both the primary and secondary as well as higher education levels. Prior to Brown v. Board of Education, integrated schools were prohibited by the Virginia constitution. The state adhered to the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) but, of course, did not follow the letter of the law. Teachers at Black schools received lower salaries, and facilities were not comparable. For example, many Black schools did not have running water, modern toilets, central heating, gymnasiums, or textbooks (Boothe, 1949) .
After Brown, there was much resistance in the state to integration at all levels of education. This resistance was spearheaded by Senator Harry F. Byrd Sr., the author of the "Southern Manifesto," a document that proclaimed that the Supreme Court's Brown decision was an abuse of power. Senator Byrd ran Virginia politics, and on February 25, 1956, he called for what became known as "massive resistance." Basically, massive resistance referred to a set of laws passed in 1958 that were a direct response to the Brown decision and intended to prevent any and all integration in Virginia. Massive resistance included three strategies: pupil placement boards, which had the power to assign specific students to particular schools; allotment of tuition grants only to those students who opposed integrated schools; and a law that cut off state funds and closed any public school that agreed to integrate (Virginia Historical Society, n.d.; Boothe, 1949) . These measures made for a difficult and hostile racial climate in the Commonwealth of Virginia. In an effort to avoid integrating the schools, for example, the legislators closed all of the public schools in Prince edward County beginning in 1959; they also closed the secondary schools in Norfolk, Charlottesville, Powhatan, and Front Royal (Picott, 1958 (Picott, , 1962 . In the case of Prince edward County, civil rights leaders Oliver Hill, Roy Wilkins, and Reverend Francis L. griffin as well as NAACP attorneys Frank D. Reeves, Henry L. Marsh III, and Samuel W. Tucker worked together to combat the closing of the schools. The involvement of the NAACP brought the attention of the media, and as a result of edward R. Murrow's reporting of the situation, the Prince edward County schools became a focus of gasman, Drezner / Fundraising for Black Colleges 5 national coverage and scorn ("Prince edwards County Schools Close," 1961; Murrow, 1959, January 21) .
The massive resistance policy spurred Blacks to wage their own resistance effort. On January 1, 1959, for example, roughly 1,800 people met at the Mosque, a Richmond, Virginia, theater, for a "pilgrimage of prayer" meeting sponsored by the CORe. After the meeting, about 800 participants marched to the state capitol, where they presented a petition urging the appointment of a biracial commission to solve Virginia's school integration crisis. Reverend Wyatt Tee Walker of Petersburg, one of the leaders of the pilgrimage of prayer, said the protesters were "just as concerned about 13,000 white children being locked out of school as they are about segregated schools" ("Pilgrimage of Prayer," 1959). The massive resistance ended in late 1959. Yet the Virginia public schools saw little change in terms of racial integration for many years. It was not until the 1970s that the state finally gave in and, under court order, implemented a desegregation policy in the Norfolk schools in which White students were bused to the formerly all-Black Booker T. Washington High School (Virginia Historical Society, n.d.). Of note, in Richmond, Virginia, the percentage of White students plummeted from 45% to 21% between 1960 and 1975 . Rather than send their children to school with Black youth, many Whites fled the cities.
During this time, there was little integration in public higher education in Virginia despite the legal mandate calling for it. For example, in 1962, there were only 56 Black students enrolled in Virginia's public colleges; at the University of Virginia, only 22 Blacks were in attendance, and Virginia Tech enrolled a mere three Black students. 5 Of course, Virginia's resistance was commonplace among states in the Deep South, but compared to its neighbor Maryland, which by 1956 had opened all of its public universities to Blacks, the Commonwealth was making little progress or effort (Bullock, 1967; Coleman, 1966) . There was a wide gap between Virginia's Black and White state universities and colleges, especially in terms of equipment, facilities, and opportunities furnished students. With few exceptions, Black students did not have opportunities to pursue education in law, medicine, dentistry, engineering, or pharmacy. They were relegated to agricultural courses (Boothe, 1949) . Although the Commonwealth of Virginia did not provide these educational offerings to Black students, they were required by their state code to furnish Blacks with facilities in some other state. Basically, Virginia made payments to an out-of-state institution so that the cost of going to college would be the same as if the student were attending a Virginia institution of higher education (Boothe, 1949 
Overall Financial Support of Black Colleges During the 1960s and 1970s
During the years after the Brown decision, Black colleges faced a hard situation, experiencing widespread deficits, fundraising struggles, low endowments, and gradually, more underprepared students (gasman, 2007) . With the fight for racial integration taking place all over the country, securing support for an all-Black institution grew ever more complicated for the leaders of Black colleges (gasman, 2007) . According to William J. Trent Jr., executive director of the UNCF, by the early 1970s, 31 of the private Black colleges were operating with deficits totaling $7.5 million; the remaining 6 UNCF colleges either broke even or had tiny surpluses (Trent, 1971; Holsendolph, 1971; Thompson, 1973) . endowment size was precariously small, with all of the private Black colleges belonging to the UNCF having endowments adding up to a mere $72,250,000. even more disconcerting in these figures was that 5 of the private colleges held "62 percent of these funds" (Trent, 1971, p. 656) . To provide context, the average endowment size of an individual historically White institution reporting to a Department of Health, education, and Welfare survey in 1963 was $63,109,000 (Wingerd, 1993) . This figure is only $9 million less than the combined total private Black college endowment. Furthermore, between 1954 and the mid-1970s, endowment values fell for Black colleges (Drewry & Doermann, 2001 (Wingerd, 1993) . Certainly, these rising deficits and low endowments were not caused entirely by the fall of legalized segregation; Black colleges had survived "on the proverbial 'shoestring' since their inception" (Thompson, 1973, p. 246 ). Yet Black colleges' troubles were aggravated by changes throughout the United States and the embrace of desegregation by many well-meaning, White liberals.
In the meantime, the foundation world was typically giving to stronger rather than weaker institutions (Thompson, 1973) . Foundation giving to higher education in the 1960s reached just over $3 billion and accounted for nearly 24.4% of voluntary support to postsecondary education (McIlnay, 1991) . As the 1960s came to a close, foundations were contributing only 0.7% of their yearly distribution to higher education to Black colleges (Thompson, 1973) . To add context to this reduction, in the 1960s, absolute foundation giving to Black colleges fell by 6.7% (from $43.26 million to $3.04 million), while foundation giving to historically White institutions rose by nearly 170% (from $159.74 million to $430.96 million; Thompson, 1973; McIlnay, 1991) . 6 Because a typical Black college relied heavily on foundation funding for their operating budget, this reduction had a meaningful impact (American Council on education, 1969; gasman, 2007) . Throughout these decades, the bulk of grants to private Black colleges were made by six foundations: Ford, Kresge, Pew, Kellogg, Mott, and Mellon. The federal government's funding policies, too, were not sympathetic to Black colleges. Although the government bettered its support for these institutions during the 1960s, comparisons to its support of historically White institutions reveal uneven funding patterns (American Council on education, 1969). For example, in the early 1970s, two federal agencies, the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Health, education, and Welfare, suggested that Black colleges relied too heavily on the federal government (American Council on education, 1969; Library of Congress; gasman & Drezner, 2009). However, interestingly, a 1971-1972 consultant report of 20 private institutions found that four historically White universities received more than 50% of their daily operating expenses from public funds, and another three received 40% to 50% of their operating budgets from the government (gasman & Drezner, 2009) . Of note, with regard to federal funding and Black colleges, is that in many instances, to meet requirements for federal matching funds, Black colleges had to redirect funding from significant student-related programs. The need for Black colleges to pilfer their own programs to garner government funds certainly contributed to the "vicious cycle" that Daniel C. Thompson describes. He notes, "About all private Black colleges are caught up in an impossible vicious cycle: they can't get essential help because they do not measure up-and they can't measure up without essential help" (Thompson, 1973, p. 247) .
even though there were clear discrepancies between the federal funding of Black and White institutions of higher education, many Black colleges nevertheless "would not have survived to the end of the 1970s without the direct and indirect assistance provided by several new federal programs" (Drewry & Doermann, 2001, p. 106) . For instance, Black colleges received funds through the National Defense education Act (1958) , focusing on programs in science, mathematics, and language. In another example, the Higher education Act of 1965 offered Basic education Opportunity grants to low-income African American students-effectively serving Black colleges. And Title III of the Higher education Act, which focused on developing institutions, supported with academic programs and student services at Black colleges (Drewry & Doermann, 2001) .
During the 1960s and 1970s, Black colleges had only modest contact with individual Black donors. Numerous Black colleges had assumed, based on salary disparities, that a campaign among their alumni would not result in any contributions (gasman & Anderson-Thompkins, 2003) .
7 Most Black colleges were just starting to add full-fledged development offices. Nonetheless, the emergent Black middle class provided a ready group of likely donors, including some individuals who could make major gifts. Interestingly, according to data from the UNCF, Blacks had been contributing to their alma maters for years but not in an organized manner (UNCF Institutional Fundraising Surveys, 1944 -1970 .
Adding to the problems encountered by Black colleges during the 1960s and 1970s were the changing student demographics-80% to 95% of their Black students were now low-income (Thompson, 1973) . With an increasing number of historically White institutions opening their doors to African American students, Black colleges could not contend in terms of scholarships, facilities, and diversity of academic programs. Prosperous (and effectively, often better prepared) Black students, on the whole, flocked to historically White institutions in the North (Drewry & Doermann, 2001; Thompson, 1973) . As could have been foretold, White students were not enrolling in any noteworthy number at Black colleges (Drewry & Doermann, 2001; gasman, 2007) . As such, Black colleges faced raising financial aid monies for low-income students as well as funds for remedial programs for underprepared students. According to Henry Drewry and Humphrey Doerman, "enrollment in the forty-six private four-year colleges increased from roughly 30,000 in 1955 to 61,000 in 1975," with the vast majority of these students coming from low-income, Black households (Drewry & Doermann, 2001, p. 105) .
The Case of Hampton Institute
Our findings include a critical look at the fundraising strategies of Hampton Institute, including its interactions with fundraising consultants who tried to push them in new directions. During the 1970s, Hampton moved its fundraising solicitations from an emphasis on foundations to corporate and individual donations (specifically from its alumni). In addition, it recast its board of trustee composition to include members who had access to wealth and who considered the institution a priority and were willing to dedicate substantial time to the institution. 8 Hampton worked hard to better articulate its mission and found financial success as a result. In 1968, the institution decided to leave the UNCF, believing that the institution could raise more funds on its own. During the first few years, it was not successful, but eventually, the widely recognized institution raised considerably more on its own than it had for years with the UNCF.
Centennial Campaign
In 1964, Hampton Institute began its Centennial Campaign, hoping to raise $18 million. To get the ball rolling, it hired the Oram Fundraising group, a for-profit fundraising organization, created by longtime liberal Harold Oram, which was dedicated to raising money for progressive causes. The Oram group has worked with a myriad of Black colleges and had ample experience negotiating fundraising gasman, Drezner / Fundraising for Black Colleges 9 relationships in the South (gasman & Drezner, 2009 ). In fact, besides the United Negro College Fund, the Oram group has raised more money for Black colleges than any other organization to date (gasman & Drezner, 2009) . After finishing an assessment of Hampton's fundraising ability, the Oram group consultants were concerned with the viability of a sustained annual fund at the institution. They noted that in a "typical" campaign of that time, board of trustee members' contributions accounted for 15% to 20% of the money raised in an annual campaign. 9 In previous campaigns at Hampton, however, board of trustee members' giving accounted for less than 1%. The Oram group consultants used a sports metaphor to demonstrate the necessity of the board's taking a greater role in fundraising, noting that "Dr. Holland can no longer rush the line all alone. Board initiative is critical. . . . Trustees with outreach to given foundations and companies should be asked to assume specific money-raising responsibilities" (Hampton Institute, 1968, p. 15) . Interes tingly, the issue was not participation, as nearly all trustees donated and "gave sacrificially"; rather, it was an issue of board wealth (Hampton Institute, 1968, p. 5; Hampton Institute, 1965 -1969 . The Oram group consultants stressed the importance of the board's being able to directly contribute at least 20% of the annual goal ($750,000 for the following year) and the fact that the board must increase its role in the solicitation of funds to be successful. In a move to make fund-raising a more perpetual activity of the board of trustees, the Oram group consultants suggested the establishment of a permanent committee on development at Hampton. Previously, the fundraising committees were tied to campaigns rather than annual giving and the daily operations of the institution. The Oram consultants suggested that membership in this new standing committee of the board would add to the leadership pipeline in the overall governance structure of the institution, cultivating future leaders of the institution (Hampton Institute, 1968) . Unlike some of its Black college peers, Hampton followed the majority of the Oram group's suggestions, moving toward the selection of board members with more access to capital and contacts (gasman & Drezner, 2009) .
Hampton used messages of racial uplift throughout its Centennial Campaign. For example, the institution's general scholarship fund request sent out in December 1964 said, Next June a young Negro who has the capacity to realize his dream of becoming a famous lawyer will be graduating from high school. To earn his diploma, he has had to surmount the handicaps of extreme poverty and the shortcomings of a segregated school system. He would like to attend HAMPTON INSTITUTe . . . without scholarship aid HAMPTON is out of the question for him. . . . This able young Negro need not be consigned to a lifetime of unfulfilled potential, unrecognized ability and unremitting economic hardship. Won't you help make real for him the promise of equal educational opportunity for all? (Hampton Institute, 1964) This letter was moderately successful raising $30,250 from 124 individuals; however, the number of letters mailed was 5,172. This 2% participation rate is substantially lower than other institutions' solicitations; however, the average gift received of $244 is higher than that of its peers (Cutlip, 1965; Council for Aid to education, 1965) . Subsequent mailings added to the campaign's success. The second letter sent to same contact list as the first raised more than $22,000 from 136 donors (Oram group, 1965) .
The campaign followed this potential Hampton student in solicitation letters. A February 1966 scholarship renewal letter chronicled his hopes of and preparation for becoming a lawyer and continued to stress the importance of scholarship aid in securing his dreams:
Higher education must precede employment in an age of automation. But 41.9% of the families of students attending predominantly Negro colleges like HAMPTON earn less than $4,000 a year. For each son or daughter who attends college, another child, equally able, may be denied this privilege. (Hampton Institute, 1966) Hampton coupled these individual solicitation letters with a campaign brochure stressing similar ideas of racial uplift. For example, the brochure used Lyndon B. Johnson's famous quote as a prologue, noting that "it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates" (Hampton Institute, 1965a) .
The success of Centennial Campaign was due to the efforts of fewer than a dozen volunteers led by President Jerome Holland (Hampton Institute, 1965b) . Under President Holland's leadership, Hampton moved away from solely focusing on corporate and foundation gifts to a focus on individual giving-a key to the Black college's success. Based on comparative data from the Voluntary Support of education Survey of 1966-1967, the Oram group consultants thought it reasonable to achieve 55% of the annual fund goals from individuals, including 20% from the board of trustee members, 10% from alumni, 5% from parents, and 20% from other concerned individuals.
10 The "other concerned individuals" included the Jewish population in Virginia and the Washington, D.C. area. The Oram group consultants encouraged the Hampton president to add more Jews to the institution's board of trustees. Specifically, they stated, There is little to no Jewish representation and this is serious because the wealthy Jewish community has always generously supported interracial and intercultural causes. The Jewish community's willingness to give and its ability to get substantial funds should not be ignored if the Board is to bear a major responsibility for annual giving. (Hampton Institute, 1965b, p. 8) In the Oram group's words, Jews had "a sensitivity to the cultural and psychological needs of Blacks" (Hampton Institute, 1965b, p. 47 (Hampton Institute, 1965b, p. 47) . When one prominent Jewish businessman was asked why he was willing to support Atlanta University, for example, his was response was, "Culture makes a community better to live in, I guess after a while one realizes man isn't just an economic animal" (Hampton Institute, 1965b, p. 47) . There is a strong history of progressive philanthropy in the Jewish community (Block, 1997; Tobin, 2001) . Traditional Jewish philanthropy rests on the concept of Tikun Olam, repairing the broken world, a principle that extends to helping both Jews and non-Jews alike (Tobin, 2001) . Parallels between the anti-Semitic quota systems that were used to exclude Jewish students from the Ivy League institutions and the barring of Blacks from historically White institutions allowed Jews to connect personally to the need for strong institutions for Black higher education (Lewis, 1984; Thelin, 2004) . Furthermore, the concept of philanthropy in Judaism supports "the need for self-help and maintenance of a separate communal order-one that enriches a distinctive and separate . . . identity" (Tobin, 2001, p. 12) .
Based on 5 years of Voluntary Support of education Surveys (1960 Surveys ( -1963 , the Oram group consultants predicted that the remaining 45% of annual donations would come from foundations (30%) and corporations (15%; Hampton Institute, 1963, p. 9).
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Interestingly, the Hampton Institute alumni participated at a much higher level than the Oram group predicted based on their understanding of Black college giving in general, boasting a participation rate of 21.1%, which was in line with the national average for alumni giving at historically White institutions at the time. The alumni raised a total of $80,000 for the annual fund per year, which was an amazing feat given the fact that Black alumni had few, and continue to have few, assets (Hampton Institute, 1963, p. 9; gasman, 2007; gasman & Anderson-Thompkins, 2003) . Research shows that those with considerable assets tend to give larger amounts to charity; however, African Americans have historically given a larger percentage of their income than the majority population (gasman & Sedgwick, 2005) . To secure alumni donations of this amount, Hampton had to enlarge its alumni giving staff. In doing so, the institution followed the advice of the Oram group consultants, which stressed the importance of spending money on personnel and infrastructure to secure alumni donations into the future (Hampton Institute, 1963, pp. 7, 23 ).
An Emphasis on Integration
One of the thrusts of Hampton's Centennial Campaign was the future integration of the institution. President Holland as well as ellsworth Bunker, the chairman of the campaign, spoke out publicly about their intentions to integrate Hampton and how this would lead to increased academic competitiveness. Holland in particular stated in 1963,
In the twentieth century we are very much a part of the development of a new order in which old barriers to equal opportunities are being eliminated. With expanding opportunities, we encounter new challenges which Hampton must be prepared to meet, that of full integration. Against this background the college has re-evaluated its program, chartered its course, and is preparing to meet the ever-demonstrably superior academic environment. (Holland, 1963) Likewise, Ellsworth Bunker tried to position Hampton not as a predominantly Black institution but as a midsized college that would serve all of American society:
For the near future, Hampton, under President Holland, proposes to become an outstanding medium-sized college, competing educationally for students and faculty without distinction of race, creed or color. Our constant objective is to reach such marked standards of excellence in education that Hampton will draw to its student body highly qualified young men and women seeking to make their contribution in the future to out American society. This is the realistic path to integration in education . . . . We who believe in America's promise of equal opportunity for all of our citizens are confident that Hampton will find the means to meet this challenge. (Bunker, 1963) He went on to comment, Despite the State government's announced policy of massive resistance to racial integration, the military and industrial families of this rapidly growing metropolitan area are increasingly sending their children to Hampton . . . . The college has already begun to include white students in its recruiting program. (Hampton Institute, 1963, p. 5) The administration of Hampton Institute understood that "to participate in the mainstream of higher education, it must become a totally integrated institution" (Hampton Institute, 1963, p. 8) . However, they also knew that this was going to be difficult. Although they contended that Hampton was integrated from its founding, they acknowledged that "in America there has only been essentially one direction in the integration movement-from Negro to white, not the reverse" (Hampton Institute, 1963, p. 8). To become "mainstream," Hampton would need to attract additional White faculty and students. As such, over a third of its $18 million Centennial Campaign was designated for endowment surrounding faculty and student recruitment and retention.
Interestingly, public proclamations pertaining to the future integration of Black colleges were quite common after the Brown decision. Black college presidents knew that they were caught in a conundrum: How could they support full-fledged integration while maintaining their own segregated institutions? To attract White students and White money, most of the Black colleges reiterated their history of educating any and all students to the media. They noted that their charters, unless required by Southern law, did not exclude White students. In addition, they highlighted their legacy of educating the White children of their missionary philanthropist founders as well as the many White faculty and administrators who had worked at Black colleges for decades. Furthermore, the leaders of Black colleges often reminded the general public that in the future, the nation would need more and more colleges and universities to handle the increasing enrollment needs of the country (gasman, 2007) . Unfortunately, due to a stigma of inferiority against Black colleges held by most Whites during civil rights era, these institutions had a difficult time attracting more than a trickle of White students and continue to have this problem in the present day (gasman, 2007) .
Hampton continued to emphasize the idea of becoming an integrated institution into the late 1970s and early 1980s during its campaigns. For example, when raising money for student scholarships, the institution claimed to be raising dollars for the "Hampton Institute Fund for Academic excellence" rather than "equal Opportunity grants," which was the term used in the mid-1960s and made reference to Blacks' needing a chance for equal opportunity (gasman, 2007) . In addition, Hampton made the case that the institution was more than a college for Black Americans. Donors should support Hampton, it contended, "to continue an alternative to mass depersonalized education experiences" (Hampton Institute, 1978, p. 2) .
Attempting to tackle some of the tough questions that were being asked of Black colleges during the post-Brown decades, including whether these institutions should even exist, its fundraising case statement, for example, answers the question by reframing it: "The question shouldn't be how do you justify Black colleges but rather when will the country acknowledge the debt owed to institutions whose contributions to society far out weigh the investments made in them?" (Hampton Institute, 1978, p. 3) . The institution emphasized the role that it had in uplifting African Americans over many decades-a strategy that was often used by the more successful Black colleges (gasman, 2007) . Hampton used this argument for support to encourage potential donors to give not because they were a Black college but rather because "academic excellence has always been stressed at Hampton Institute." Specifically, "Hampton will do what no other Black college has dared to do. It will meet enormous and overwhelming challenge of attempting to reach the highest level of academic excellence attainable" (Hampton Institute, 1978, pp. 3-4) .
To further solidify the institution's importance to the larger Virginia community, Hampton drew attention to the economic impact that it was having on the Commonwealth. In 1977 and 1978, this impact was valued at $14,483,000, not including the salaries of Hampton alumni in that remained in the area, which were valued at an additional $18,000,000 (Hampton Institute, 1977) .
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A Decision to Withdraw From the UNCF
The UNCF is a collective fundraising organization created in 1944 by Tuskegee president Frederick D. Patterson. In the mid-1960s, the organization had, depending on the year, roughly 39 member colleges. The general idea behind participation in the fund was that the group of colleges could raise more than the colleges could on their own. However, with membership in the UNCF came a restriction on a college's fundraising efforts. During the UNCF campaign season, individual colleges could not raise monies for their own institutions; all of their efforts needed to be aimed at supporting the UNCF member colleges. This policy led some Black college leaders to want to break away from the institution, especially those that had strong ties to corporations and foundations and a solid foundation, such as Hampton (gasman, 2007) .
For years, Hampton had relied on UNCF funds to compensate for budget shortfalls and to help mitigate deficit spending. The Hampton Institute's decision to leave the UNCF came in 1968; although the UNCF allotment was used each year, the Hampton administration thought that they could raise more money on their own, thus alleviating budget shortfalls. The Oram group consultants, although acknowledging that there were "considerable" advantages to withdrawing from the UNCF, informed the Hampton board of trustees of the immediate fundraising realities of that decision. If the Centennial Campaign gifts are removed from the calculations, Hampton Institute raised $372,263 in undesignated cash receipts; $200,000 of that figure was attained from its UNCF allocation. Therefore, Hampton on its own had raised only $127,263 that could be used for college operations. The Oram group consultants starkly pointed out, "What Hampton Institute raised on its own last year for annual operations would, at present levels, run the College for five days and 16 hours" (Hampton Institute, 1968, p. 4) . Regardless of the Oram group consultants' predictions, Hampton planned to withdraw from the UNCF. Upon hearing that the institution's withdrawal was imminent, the Oram group consultants noted that "campaigning for annual funds must begin" immediately to succeed (Hampton Institute, 1968, p. 14) .
Hampton's withdrawal from the UNCF made strong ties to corporations and foundations essential. There was a need to create a simple and clear case for support because there was "no question that many corporations and foundations [would] continue to hide behind UNCF donations whether [Hampton Institute was] a member or not" (Hampton Institute, 1968, p. 14; gasman, 2007) . As Oram group consultants cautioned, "no trustee should assume for a moment that there are more grapes in the vineyard for Hampton Institute, simply because it has decided to make wine alone" (Hampton Institute, 1968, p. 14) . When addressing members of the corporate sector, interim president and Hampton alumnus Carl M. Hill would often underscore the transactional nature of the relationship occurring between the institution and the corporation. For example, on one occasion, he stated, "I am convinced that by constantly upgrading the college program through investments by industry, Hampton can pay 1960; 1964; 1965; 1973; 1974; 1975; 1976; 1977; 1978; 1979) . 16 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly dividends by offering a corporate partnership designed to help solve manpower training needs of American business and industry" (Hill, 1977a) . Withdrawal from the UNCF increased the importance of using language like "pay dividends" and the necessity of helping the corporations to see their support of Hampton as an investment in their future.
Another consequence of withdrawal from the UNCF was the status of faculty, staff, and student participation in the annual fund (UNCF Annual Reports, 1960 -1980 . The Oram consultants suggested that although the potential dollars raised from these groups were likely low, the participation would be extremely valuable because of Hampton's ability to demonstrate to outside donors that "the Hampton family's committed to the cause" (Hampton Institute, 1968, p. 34) . Having this internal support had been beneficial in the Centennial Campaign. The participation by faculty and staff reached 85%, an impressive show of dedication to Hampton (Hampton Institute, 1968) . This kind of internal support helped spur increased giving in the post-UNCF days. For example, in 1978, Hampton surpassed its in-state fundraising goal of $73,000 by more than $3,500 (Hampton Institute, n.d.). Of note, most Black colleges rarely asked faculty and staff for financial support. These individuals performed their professional duties for so modest an amount that college administrators felt awkward asking them to contribute what little they earned (Drewry & Doermann, 1999; gasman, 2007; Thompson, 1973) .
During this same time, the institution had to increase its alumni giving to make up for the loss of UNCF dollars. In the late 1970s, interim president Carl M. Hill called on his fellow alumni to participate in the institution's transformation: "How deep is our devotion, how strong is our commitment, how tenacious is our will, how lasting is our faith, how strong is our unity, how consistent and timely is our action? The time for unity, the time for demonstration of loyalty, the time for action in support of our alma mater is now-because now Hampton is undergoing a transformation and making a new commitment to the future" (Hill, 1977b) . The institution struggled to replace the UNCF funds for several years but eventually was able to thrive, currently boasting an endowment of $186 million, a balanced operating budget, and an alumni giving rate of 15%.
An analysis of annual Voluntary Support of education Surveys compiled throughout the 1970s shows that the Hampton Institute was marginally successful after breaking from the UNCF in 1968. Table 1 illustrates that as warned by the Oram group, Hampton had varied success in raising funds from different constituents throughout its first decade of disassociation from the UNCF. Not accounting for inflation, the absolute dollars raised by Hampton remained virtually the same throughout the decade, whereas the alumni support increased each year. Alumni giving as a percentage of total support grew 5% to 13% after Hampton's departure from the UNCF. Interestingly, according to a recent U.S. News and World Report ranking of Black colleges, Hampton is ranked third. The rest of the institutions in the top 10 are members of the UNCF. 
Conclusion
This case study focuses on one institution-Hampton Institute-but this small Black college's challenges are representative of many Black colleges during the civil rights era (gasman, 2007) . Likewise, although Hampton developed fundraising strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, many of these strategies are still relevant today as Black colleges struggle to identify their role in a post-Brown era and in a time when some members of the White community are hostile toward anything that resembles racial preferences, be it federal support of Black colleges or institutional support of diversity. Nearly 40 years have passed, but Black colleges face many of the same issues that they did during the civil rights era.
To this day, Black colleges struggle with their ability to locate and energize active board of trustee members. Some Black colleges are obligated to include members of the churches with whom they are affiliated. Although having a voice from the church can be important to the history and tradition of the institutions, these members tend to hold the colleges back and rarely give substantially or have connections to wealth. Having one board member of this sort does not have a significant impact, but many Black colleges are saddled with four or five and suffer because of this arrangement. Black colleges also have difficulty finding board members who are not already committed to many other causes. Although these individuals can use their connections to assist the Black colleges, they are often pulled in a myriad of directions and cannot offer the kind of focused attention that many Black colleges need.
As with the need to attract active board members, alumni giving participation rates continue to be a challenge for most Black colleges. In 2006, alumni giving rates for majority institutions averaged 25%, but for Black colleges, they hovered around 6% to 9% (gasman, 2006) . Not only do alumni contributions offset institutional costs and build endowments, but they provide evidence to corporate and foundation donors that Black colleges are supported by their internal constituents. Until recently (and there are still some cases of neglect), Black college fundraising offices relied too heavily on foundation and corporate gifts, failing to ask their alumni to support the institution. Majority institutions, by and large, begin cultivating alumni when they are still students, typically in their sophomore years. Black colleges must follow Hampton's lead, investing in personnel and infrastructure to secure alumni donations. Furthermore, according to recent research and based on the history of Black giving in the United States, Black colleges need to speak to the concept of racial uplift when approaching African American donors (gasman & AndersonThompkins, 2003; gasman & Sedgwick, 2005) . Hampton found much success through this strategy. With the very idea of racial uplift at their core, reminding alumni and individual donors of the unique role that Black colleges play in the lives of African Americans is essential.
Perhaps one of the most interesting lessons from the case of Hampton Institute during the civil rights era is the institution's emphasis on integrating its campus and 18 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly subsequent lack of success. As noted, the majority of Black colleges used a similar approach after the Brown decision as they did not have a choice-it was impossible and improbable to ask donors to support what appeared to be segregated institutions. Many private Black colleges have continued to try and integrate their campuses with the hope of increasing the longevity of their institutions, gaining additional tuition dollars, and attracting White dollars. However, aside from a handful of public institutions, private Black colleges have remained close to 98% African American (National Center for educational Statistics, 2007) . In a nation in which being "Black" continues to carry a stigma of inferiority, these Black colleges, regardless of their academic quality, have not been able to attract and enroll large numbers of White students. The Hampton administration had a point-rarely do we see an institution move from Black to White; it is almost always the reverse.
Last, Hampton Institute was faced with convincing potential donors, especially those in the corporate and foundation worlds, that the institution was still relevant in a post-Brown era. Although Black colleges have survived for more than 50 years since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown, these institutions continue to have to prove their relevancy to various constituents, including policy makers, the media, and the scholarly community. In the past 3 years alone, there have been countless newspaper stories and editorials questioning the very existence of Black colleges despite the fact that they enroll 16% and graduate 24% of all African American students (National Center for educational Statistics, 2007) .
12 Perhaps the greatest argument in favor of the relevancy of Black colleges is their role in uplifting African Americans and, in effect, society at large. Notes 1. A review of annual reports between 1955 and 1980 demonstrates the Ford Foundation's commitment to a few Black colleges. Specifically, the reports state that Ford's Minorities in Higher education Focus will provide "major developmental grants to a limited number of traditionally black, private colleges." 2. It should be noted that there is a growing body of research on fundraising in communities of color (see Carson, 1987a Carson, , 1987b Carson, , 1990 Pettey, 2002; Smith, Shue, Vest, & Villarreal, 1999) . However, this research does not take into account fundraising at Black colleges.
3. The Oram group is a progressive fundraising consulting firm based in New York City that worked with many Black colleges, including Hampton, in the post-Brown and civil rights movement eras. The Oram group is credited with helping historically Black colleges raise more money than any other group besides the United Negro College Fund.
4. Please note that some of the interviews were conducted with the authors and others are housed in the Columbia University Oral History Collection.
5. enrollment (or lack thereof) of Black college students in 1962 was a national issue. However, historical data held by the National Center for education Statistics did not indicate the number of Black high school completers or college enrollments in 1962. This is due to the small sample size and therefore large sampling error (Snyder, Dillow, & Hoffman, 2008, p. 284, Table 192 ). Through the use of secondary sources and archival documents, we determined that although only a few Blacks were admitted to historically White institutions until the early 1970s, some small gains were made prior to that time in Northern states, in gasman, Drezner / Fundraising for Black Colleges 19 border states, and on occasion, in a state in the Deep South. Consider the following: In 1948, the University of Arkansas admitted a Black student to its medical school. In the same year, the University of Delaware allowed Blacks to take classes if the classes they needed were not offered at Delaware State College for Negroes, and in 1950, on court order, the institution admitted Black students "without restriction." Likewise, the University of Kentucky started to admit Blacks to its graduate programs in 1949. even Louisiana State University began admitting Blacks, as a result of a court order, in 1950. In 1954, the University of Maryland opened its undergraduate program to Blacks, having opened their graduate programs, by force of law, in 1950. By 1954, all of the colleges and universities in the state of Missouri desegregated. The University of Oklahoma was desegregated in 1948 by court order and the state's other public institutions followed suit within the year. All of West Virginia's 11 state institutions were desegregated by 1954. By 1956, three Southern states opened all of the public institutions to Blacks. These were Kentucky, Maryland, and Oklahoma. The same was the case in the state of Tennessee, where Blacks were attending all but one of the state's public institutions. Of course, the exceptions were the states in the Deep South, including Alabama, Florida, georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina. For more information, see Bullock (1967) . See also Coleman (1966) and various issues of Southern School News.
6. Total foundation giving in 1960 was $163 million (McIlnay, 1991) . Using the breakdown from Thompson's (1973) 7. This salary differential also had an impact on how Black colleges benefited from the previously mentioned corporate matching gift programs.
8. Although one would assume that all board of trustee members would consider the institution on whose board they serve a priority, this was not necessarily the case at many Black colleges.
9. Although fundraising consultants are often prone to hyperbole, according to Scott Cutlip's (1965) classic book Fundraising in the United States, the Oram group's numbers were accurate.
10. Our review of the [1966] [1967] Voluntary Support of education Survey shows that the Oram consultants were realistic in the figure that they put forth for the Hampton leadership.
11. Our review of the Voluntary Support of education Surveys shows that the Oram consultants were being slightly optimistic. Their numbers may have been on target for historically White institutions, but they were slightly high for Black colleges. However, the Oram group tended not to underestimate Black colleges like most other fundraising consultants that worked with them (e.g., Marts and Lundy).
12. For these news stories, see The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Atlanta Journal Constitution, among other national newspapers.
